The Russians inherited the same problem the Soviets got from the Tsars, a lack of decent NCOs. The Russians always used lieutenants to the job of NCOs and the culture of brutalizing the new conscripts was never resolved. Prior to the war, draft dodging was a major problem because nobody worth drafting wanted to be drafted. The Russians have always been top down, this is just the latest showing of how hard it is to change culture.
An anecdote on the Ukrainian mind-set: some combat engineer buddies of mine trained Ukrainians before the full scale invasion (Op Unifier). Those guys, to this day, have telegram and whatsapp calls to work on problems together in real time. When Ukrainian engineers aren't sure about something, they care to learn and aren't afaird to ask.
If you study Russias military history, its military reputation has pretty much been based on WW2 and getting Napoleon to freeze his army to death - every other major conflict has been a debacle.
As the past 3+ years have demonstrated in Ukraine & before that in Afghanistan, Chechnya or anywhere the Soviet/Russian military has been involved in combat operations, they've failed everytime aside from inflicting catastrophic & indiscriminate damage where ever they touch.
Wes, I subscribe both places. I think Substack has a far more diverse audience than Medium, and more intelligent generally. Medium is 100% liberal/prog and brooks no dissent. The mods cancel conservatives, and bloggers do as well. I vastly prefer Substack. This is where the big boys play.
I agree. From a financial perspective, I used to earn a decent wage writing on Medium, but it has been steadily declining over 2025. I feel like I need to put more energy into Substack and cultivate a community that I can grow with as a writer.
[Not an expert] When Russia invaded Ukraine, supposed experts said Kiev would fall in days. Then truck tires were seen flat, rotting. And cold war era tanks, rusted hulks, pulled from outdoor storage, were thrown into battle. And Armata was nowhere to be seen.
Did the US, NATO, whatever, military already know Russia's readiness? And just kept quiet? I am not surprised about discretion with intel, just wondering.
Good question, Lee. The failure to see how bad the Russian military had become is, in my opinion, one of the largest intelligence failures in CIA history. Comparable to the failure to see 9/11 coming. I believe there was some understanding (of some degree) of Russian corruption, but it was vastly underestimated by the US.
Having said that, some of my fellow analysts claim that the US knew, but disclosure would have revealed sources and methods inside the Russian government. So they chose to deliberately keep quiet.
Personally, I think some grift was expected, but for the most part, the US believed at the time that Russia had a modern military. Turned out to be far more widespread than anyone could have imagined. Never underestimate greed! lol
Given what's been happening to American intelligence under the current régime, including a deliberate axing of intelligence gathering vis à vis the Russians, the USA will become even less able to evaluate the true state of Russian preparedness.
To be fair, that stuff relies on HUMINT rather than, for example, signals intercepts. And if the Russian personnel themselves are ignorant of the true state of things, then so will the intelligence agencies. The higher-ups won’t see the troops often enough to see what is being hidden from them, and the lower ranks will be ignorant of the bigger picture.
They were expecting Russia to concentrate its forces as a big hammer for the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zapor, and Kherson oblasts, rather than splitting their offensive into three separate directions.
If they had ignored Kiev and Kharkiv directions, and done what I stated, they likely would have had the concentrated mass to take those four oblasts. By splitting their strength, they didn’t have operational reserves to hold their gains in Kharkiv and the Kiev direction.
The article by Wes is silly though. The Russians clearly switched their tactical doctrine in late 2023 to “bite and hold” combined with alternating pressure distributed across wide fronts and carried out by squad and platoon level units whose only objective was to take and hold the first line of defense in front of them and then consolidating the new line rather than overextending.
This tactic was perfected by the Brits at the battle of Passchendaele in 1917-1918. It creates very slow advances that are very difficult to counterattack.
The Russians have also all but abandoned the big arrow offensives that NATO spent 45 years planning and training against. Instead they do limited attacks to create a salient, and then do the same a bit further down the line to create a fire pocket for the UAF defenders. They then use drones and artillery to attack reinforcements and resupply, forcing the defenders to eventually abandon the pocket for more advantageous positions further back.
Wes should know this, as it explains the reality of the battlefield since the defense of Avdiivka was broken in December of 2023.
Almost two years of tactical repetition and Wes is not able to take off the blue and yellow tinted glasses.
Occasionally I’ll bring an article over from Medium because I have subscribers on Substack who don’t subscribe over there. I don’t like to do this because my readers who follow me at both places will get double emails. Moving forward, I will strive to end this practice and provide completely original content at both places. Thanks for reading. W
"...the original sin, which is a command culture that cannot handle truth." This sounds like the very core of failure within any organization. Russia today is the grand history lesson for any student of organizational behavior.
The same thing happened when the USSR dissolved, it turned out to be a convenient bogeyman to show Congress for funding. The corruption has never gone away and the Army is more of a palace guard than a real force.
Of course there are good units but good units take years to develop and daily practice to maintain.
Interservice communication, logistics and inability to deviate from planned attacks whilst maintaining cohesion are basic problems for the Russians. It should be pointed out that most in the Army are now inexperienced and untrained and their needs are not met for purposes beyond shields and ‘meat’
The Russians inherited the same problem the Soviets got from the Tsars, a lack of decent NCOs. The Russians always used lieutenants to the job of NCOs and the culture of brutalizing the new conscripts was never resolved. Prior to the war, draft dodging was a major problem because nobody worth drafting wanted to be drafted. The Russians have always been top down, this is just the latest showing of how hard it is to change culture.
An anecdote on the Ukrainian mind-set: some combat engineer buddies of mine trained Ukrainians before the full scale invasion (Op Unifier). Those guys, to this day, have telegram and whatsapp calls to work on problems together in real time. When Ukrainian engineers aren't sure about something, they care to learn and aren't afaird to ask.
100%
If you study Russias military history, its military reputation has pretty much been based on WW2 and getting Napoleon to freeze his army to death - every other major conflict has been a debacle.
They 100% did. Now, these improvements are mainly around the edges and are of generally small degree, but the answer is yes.
But they are still nowhere near a near-peer to America
As the past 3+ years have demonstrated in Ukraine & before that in Afghanistan, Chechnya or anywhere the Soviet/Russian military has been involved in combat operations, they've failed everytime aside from inflicting catastrophic & indiscriminate damage where ever they touch.
Wes, I subscribe both places. I think Substack has a far more diverse audience than Medium, and more intelligent generally. Medium is 100% liberal/prog and brooks no dissent. The mods cancel conservatives, and bloggers do as well. I vastly prefer Substack. This is where the big boys play.
I agree. From a financial perspective, I used to earn a decent wage writing on Medium, but it has been steadily declining over 2025. I feel like I need to put more energy into Substack and cultivate a community that I can grow with as a writer.
100% - I am not a Medium subscriber so I won’t get to see your content there.
[Not an expert] When Russia invaded Ukraine, supposed experts said Kiev would fall in days. Then truck tires were seen flat, rotting. And cold war era tanks, rusted hulks, pulled from outdoor storage, were thrown into battle. And Armata was nowhere to be seen.
Did the US, NATO, whatever, military already know Russia's readiness? And just kept quiet? I am not surprised about discretion with intel, just wondering.
Good question, Lee. The failure to see how bad the Russian military had become is, in my opinion, one of the largest intelligence failures in CIA history. Comparable to the failure to see 9/11 coming. I believe there was some understanding (of some degree) of Russian corruption, but it was vastly underestimated by the US.
Having said that, some of my fellow analysts claim that the US knew, but disclosure would have revealed sources and methods inside the Russian government. So they chose to deliberately keep quiet.
Personally, I think some grift was expected, but for the most part, the US believed at the time that Russia had a modern military. Turned out to be far more widespread than anyone could have imagined. Never underestimate greed! lol
Given what's been happening to American intelligence under the current régime, including a deliberate axing of intelligence gathering vis à vis the Russians, the USA will become even less able to evaluate the true state of Russian preparedness.
To be fair, that stuff relies on HUMINT rather than, for example, signals intercepts. And if the Russian personnel themselves are ignorant of the true state of things, then so will the intelligence agencies. The higher-ups won’t see the troops often enough to see what is being hidden from them, and the lower ranks will be ignorant of the bigger picture.
They were expecting Russia to concentrate its forces as a big hammer for the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zapor, and Kherson oblasts, rather than splitting their offensive into three separate directions.
If they had ignored Kiev and Kharkiv directions, and done what I stated, they likely would have had the concentrated mass to take those four oblasts. By splitting their strength, they didn’t have operational reserves to hold their gains in Kharkiv and the Kiev direction.
The article by Wes is silly though. The Russians clearly switched their tactical doctrine in late 2023 to “bite and hold” combined with alternating pressure distributed across wide fronts and carried out by squad and platoon level units whose only objective was to take and hold the first line of defense in front of them and then consolidating the new line rather than overextending.
This tactic was perfected by the Brits at the battle of Passchendaele in 1917-1918. It creates very slow advances that are very difficult to counterattack.
The Russians have also all but abandoned the big arrow offensives that NATO spent 45 years planning and training against. Instead they do limited attacks to create a salient, and then do the same a bit further down the line to create a fire pocket for the UAF defenders. They then use drones and artillery to attack reinforcements and resupply, forcing the defenders to eventually abandon the pocket for more advantageous positions further back.
Wes should know this, as it explains the reality of the battlefield since the defense of Avdiivka was broken in December of 2023.
Almost two years of tactical repetition and Wes is not able to take off the blue and yellow tinted glasses.
Occasionally I’ll bring an article over from Medium because I have subscribers on Substack who don’t subscribe over there. I don’t like to do this because my readers who follow me at both places will get double emails. Moving forward, I will strive to end this practice and provide completely original content at both places. Thanks for reading. W
…”NEWS AND ANALYSIS
Paper bear: the myth of Russian invincibility is blackmail for negotiations
By EUvsDisinfo
February 21, 2025”
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/paper-bear-the-myth-of-russian-invincibility-is-blackmail-for-negotiations/
"...the original sin, which is a command culture that cannot handle truth." This sounds like the very core of failure within any organization. Russia today is the grand history lesson for any student of organizational behavior.
Remember the Russian Federation is not the USSR. To the extent the USSR had power, it came from outside of Russia.
The lazerpig loop is real
Well written, lots of great metaphors in there that made me chuckle.
The same thing happened when the USSR dissolved, it turned out to be a convenient bogeyman to show Congress for funding. The corruption has never gone away and the Army is more of a palace guard than a real force.
Of course there are good units but good units take years to develop and daily practice to maintain.
Interservice communication, logistics and inability to deviate from planned attacks whilst maintaining cohesion are basic problems for the Russians. It should be pointed out that most in the Army are now inexperienced and untrained and their needs are not met for purposes beyond shields and ‘meat’
General Mark Hertling saw this early.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-commanded-u-s-army-europe-heres-what-i-saw-in-the-russian-and-ukrainian-armies/
If us army say Russian are weak like Bangladesh, can they ask 40 biliard for new weapons?