Very interesting article. I would love to hear more about how Ukraine reformed itself before and during the war, how USA and NATO helped, and what USA and NATO can learn from Ukraine going forward.
Hi Michael, there are a couple of lessons I think NATO can learn that probably deserve a full article all its own, but first, agility beats size. Ukraine proved that leaner, adaptable structures can outperform larger, rigid ones. Second, technology has to move from lab to frontline VERY quickly. Volunteer coders armed with duct tape and office PCs built tools that NATO committees would still be debating. Finally, the human element matters most. Ukrainian commanders learned to think laterally, delegate authority, and improvise, skills NATO sometimes underestimates in its highly standardized playbook. In the US, special operations has the Ukrainian-level of flexibility, but for the rank and file troops, doctrine has turned to dogma.
It is crazy that we have gotten to the point where an Eastern European military is better able to “think laterally, delegate authority, and improvise” than Western militaries. That used to be our strength.
Wes, fantastic article. I’ve been waiting for this. I would double down on your sentiment to say that Ukraine has been misperceived as a drag on the West when from a strategic perspective it is a top asset. We have so much to learn from their unbelievably nimble tactics and fierce determination. You said it: we should be grateful students. Thank you again for sharing your insights.
Hi Rob, the revival of corps-level command in Ukraine was a result of the pressure of war exposing the flaws in the old structure. That said, leadership shifts absolutely accelerated the process. I remember watching the little green men Russian invasion in 2014 and watching Ukraine's military fold very quickly. They later regrouped and put together a pretty stiff resistance in the Donbas. I called it Europe's forgotten war... until 2022.
When Zaluzhnyi became Commander-in-Chief in 2021, he brought a very different mindset than some of his predecessors. Where earlier generals had often leaned on Soviet-era rigidity, Zaluzhnyi understood that Ukraine needed NATO-style joint operations, corps-level flexibility, and decentralized decision-making. He had already been involved in reforms like Order No. 141 back in 2019, so he was primed to reintroduce corps headquarters once the invasion exposed the chaos of trying to manage dozens of brigades from a thin operational layer.
The war itself forced the issue. By mid-2022, brigade commanders were overloaded, senior generals were micromanaging units directly, and temporary ad hoc staffs were falling apart under fire. That was unsustainable as the Russians proved trying to manage it this way themselves. The corps system was the fix because it restored a missing layer of command between strategic and tactical. The corps comeback was tied to leadership changes, but more importantly, it was tied to Ukraine finally breaking with Soviet habits. The new commanders understood that you can’t fight a 1,200-kilometer front the way you manage a peacekeeping mission in Congo. Corps headquarters gave Ukraine a NATO-like structure, but with a wartime urgency NATO itself hasn’t had to face in decades.
These changes are great to see, Wes. But still we have seen multiple incidents of successful commanders complaining or even resigning over the behavior of the "stupid generals." They demanded holding positions that were best abandoned, needlessly costing many lives. How should one think about this?.
Hi Paul, those complaints, commanders resigning, officers pushing back on orders to “hold at all costs,” are real. They reflect friction between a new, flexible corps/division structure and a handful of senior leaders who sometimes default to Soviet-style rigidity. In the Soviet mindset, territory mattered more than soldiers. You held ground even when it was tactically useless, and you bled units dry in the process. That instinct dies hard. But unlike in the Red Army, today’s Ukrainian commanders are willing to speak up, resign, or even go public about suicidal orders. That alone is a revolution. In 1942, a Soviet colonel who abandoned a position without orders would be shot. In 2025, a Ukrainian brigade commander might resign, criticize the decision, and still have a career after. That shift toward accountability and debate is a feature of Ukraine’s reform, not a flaw.
Very interesting article. I would love to hear more about how Ukraine reformed itself before and during the war, how USA and NATO helped, and what USA and NATO can learn from Ukraine going forward.
Hi Michael, there are a couple of lessons I think NATO can learn that probably deserve a full article all its own, but first, agility beats size. Ukraine proved that leaner, adaptable structures can outperform larger, rigid ones. Second, technology has to move from lab to frontline VERY quickly. Volunteer coders armed with duct tape and office PCs built tools that NATO committees would still be debating. Finally, the human element matters most. Ukrainian commanders learned to think laterally, delegate authority, and improvise, skills NATO sometimes underestimates in its highly standardized playbook. In the US, special operations has the Ukrainian-level of flexibility, but for the rank and file troops, doctrine has turned to dogma.
Thanks for the reply.
It is crazy that we have gotten to the point where an Eastern European military is better able to “think laterally, delegate authority, and improvise” than Western militaries. That used to be our strength.
Wes, fantastic article. I’ve been waiting for this. I would double down on your sentiment to say that Ukraine has been misperceived as a drag on the West when from a strategic perspective it is a top asset. We have so much to learn from their unbelievably nimble tactics and fierce determination. You said it: we should be grateful students. Thank you again for sharing your insights.
An astonishing assessment and one that promises the only just outcome for this war of Russia’s making. Слава Україні!
Wes, was the revival of a corp structure connected to the change in army commanders?
Hi Rob, the revival of corps-level command in Ukraine was a result of the pressure of war exposing the flaws in the old structure. That said, leadership shifts absolutely accelerated the process. I remember watching the little green men Russian invasion in 2014 and watching Ukraine's military fold very quickly. They later regrouped and put together a pretty stiff resistance in the Donbas. I called it Europe's forgotten war... until 2022.
When Zaluzhnyi became Commander-in-Chief in 2021, he brought a very different mindset than some of his predecessors. Where earlier generals had often leaned on Soviet-era rigidity, Zaluzhnyi understood that Ukraine needed NATO-style joint operations, corps-level flexibility, and decentralized decision-making. He had already been involved in reforms like Order No. 141 back in 2019, so he was primed to reintroduce corps headquarters once the invasion exposed the chaos of trying to manage dozens of brigades from a thin operational layer.
The war itself forced the issue. By mid-2022, brigade commanders were overloaded, senior generals were micromanaging units directly, and temporary ad hoc staffs were falling apart under fire. That was unsustainable as the Russians proved trying to manage it this way themselves. The corps system was the fix because it restored a missing layer of command between strategic and tactical. The corps comeback was tied to leadership changes, but more importantly, it was tied to Ukraine finally breaking with Soviet habits. The new commanders understood that you can’t fight a 1,200-kilometer front the way you manage a peacekeeping mission in Congo. Corps headquarters gave Ukraine a NATO-like structure, but with a wartime urgency NATO itself hasn’t had to face in decades.
Thanks for the explication!
These changes are great to see, Wes. But still we have seen multiple incidents of successful commanders complaining or even resigning over the behavior of the "stupid generals." They demanded holding positions that were best abandoned, needlessly costing many lives. How should one think about this?.
Hi Paul, those complaints, commanders resigning, officers pushing back on orders to “hold at all costs,” are real. They reflect friction between a new, flexible corps/division structure and a handful of senior leaders who sometimes default to Soviet-style rigidity. In the Soviet mindset, territory mattered more than soldiers. You held ground even when it was tactically useless, and you bled units dry in the process. That instinct dies hard. But unlike in the Red Army, today’s Ukrainian commanders are willing to speak up, resign, or even go public about suicidal orders. That alone is a revolution. In 1942, a Soviet colonel who abandoned a position without orders would be shot. In 2025, a Ukrainian brigade commander might resign, criticize the decision, and still have a career after. That shift toward accountability and debate is a feature of Ukraine’s reform, not a flaw.