Russia Captures a Bradley, Immediately Wonders Why Their Stuff Sucks
In a rare admission, Russia concedes the Bradley is better than their own BMP armored vehicles
Did I ever tell you the story of how a Bradley Fighting Vehicle ran me over in the Army?
It was part of a training exercise in the infantry to teach us to keep calm and still perform our jobs in extreme conditions.
We were to let the Bradley, a stand-in for an enemy tank, roll over us and then pop up and shoot it in the rear armor with an AT-4 anti-tank rocket. Trust me, 28 tons moving by inches from your head will trigger some pucker factor.
Since then, I’ve had a healthy respect for the Bradley.
Now, Russia has finally admitted what Ukrainian infantry and American armor crews have known for years: the M2 Bradley isn’t just better than the Russian BMP-3, it’s in another league entirely.
Thanks to a captured Ukrainian M2A2 ODS SA variant currently sitting in a Russian test facility, the Kremlin’s own armored warfare experts have quietly dropped the bravado and published a rare moment of candor.
The 38th Research and Testing Institute of Armored Vehicles under the Russian Ministry of Defense ran a full comparative study between their beloved BMP-3 and the American Bradley.
The results? Russia’s infantry fighting vehicle is lighter, weaker, and far more vulnerable.
Their words, not mine.
Let’s break it down.
Survivability: Bradley Walks Away from Blasts, BMP-3 Burns
In war, survivability isn’t a feature. It’s a philosophy. And in this department, the M2 Bradley doesn’t just beat the BMP-3, it’s practically Aristotle.
When a Russian Kornet anti-tank missile slams into a Bradley, it often results in a fire, some cosmetic damage, and a very angry Ukrainian crew who get out, assess the damage, and radio in for recovery. When the same Kornet hits a BMP-3, it’s usually followed by a fireball, a catastrophic cook-off of ammunition, and a TikTok video with the caption “Another mobile crematorium.”
Why the difference? Let’s talk design.
The Bradley’s armor package was designed from the ground up to account for modern battlefield realities. This includes spaced laminate armor, optional reactive panels, and a well-armored underbelly that helps blunt the force of mine blasts and IEDs.
The crew sits in a protected cell, insulated from the vehicle’s fuel and ammunition, because in the West, we like our infantry not flambéed.
Now contrast that with the BMP-3, which was built with a different goal in mind: flotation. The BMP-3’s aluminum hull makes it light enough to swim, but that weight savings comes at a cost.
Aluminum burns. And when it does, it melts into the crew compartment like lava. Worse, the BMP-3 stores fuel in the side armor and under the troop seats. Let that sink in. Fuel. Beneath. The. Seats. Who thought that was a good idea?
The BMP-3 also suffers from what can only be called catastrophic design layering. Fuel, ammunition, and crew are stacked like a human panini press. One well-placed hit doesn’t just wound the vehicle, it sets off a chain reaction that turns the whole thing into a pressurized fireball.
This is why the BMP-3 rarely suffers partial damage. It either escapes untouched or explodes like a propane tank at a backyard barbecue.
That binary survivability profile is not one you want to bet your life on.
The Bradley, by contrast, is a damage sponge. Its compartmentalized design and blow-out panels mean it can take a hit and keep its people alive.
We’ve seen Bradleys that had their entire engine compartments shredded by anti-tank mines, only for the crew to pop the hatch, walk out, and start filming the aftermath. That’s the difference armor design makes when you build for survival instead of speed.
Let’s not forget the mine resistance factor. The Bradley was upgraded over decades of IED experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has V-hull reinforcement options and a ride height designed to mitigate blast shockwaves.
The BMP-3, by comparison, was designed in the Cold War to cross rivers, not survive insurgent ambushes or layered artillery barrages. The Russian MoD’s own testing noted its “critical vulnerabilities” to underbelly blasts, which is military-speak for “everyone inside dies.”
Even in defensive upgrades, the BMP-3 is playing catch-up. Russia’s current field modifications consist of welded steel plates, sandbags, and bolted-on ERA, which sometimes does more harm than good. In some cases, that hastily added reactive armor has caused sympathetic detonations with internal ammo stores, effectively turning the vehicle into a grenade with tracks.
Meanwhile, the Bradley's combat survivability is so robust that it's now routinely used in direct engagements with Russian armor, not just troop transport. Ukrainian crews are confident enough in the platform that they’re using it to bait enemy tanks, absorb the first shot, and return fire with TOW missiles from cover.
That’s not a difference in tactics. That’s a difference in confidence born of design.
So, when Russian analysts quietly recommend adding “ballistic glass” to the BMP-3’s commander's station, or when they float ideas like “armored side skirts” and “relocation of fuel cells,” they’re not brainstorming—they’re surrendering to the reality that their flagship IFV is structurally unfit for this kind of war.
The battlefield doesn’t lie. And neither do the wrecks that line the roads of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Robotyne.
The Bradley might be a beast to maintain, and yes, it’s a gas-guzzler with a silhouette only a defense contractor could love, but it gets the job done. More importantly, it gets its crew home.
In a war where survival is measured in seconds, that makes all the difference.
Firepower: Quantity vs. Quality
At first glance, the BMP-3 looks like it might hold the edge. It’s armed with a 100mm main gun, a 30mm 2A72 autocannon, and a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun.
That’s a lot of bang.
But as the Russian report concedes, the Bradley's 25mm M242 Bushmaster cannon, with its superior stabilization and advanced optics, hits harder and more precisely. Side-by-side tests revealed the Bradley doubles the BMP-3 in both accuracy and armor penetration.
And here’s the kicker: the BMP-3’s massive 100mm gun is manually loaded, slow-firing, and largely ineffective against modern armor. It’s better at flattening buildings than killing IFVs. Meanwhile, the Bradley’s TOW missile launcher offers long-range tank-killing capability that the BMP-3 just can’t match.
In fact, during the Gulf War, M2 Bradleys destroyed more Iraqi armored vehicles (of Russian design) than the M1 Abrams main battle tank! This was largely thanks to the TOW.
Russian analysts now talk openly about needing to “develop a dart round” for their autocannon and, brace yourself, “borrow design solutions from Western IFVs.” For a country that used to mock NATO gear as bloated and overengineered, that’s a hell of a pivot.
Mobility: Where the BMP-3 Fights Back

It’s not all bad news for the Russians. The BMP-3 does edge out the Bradley in some categories, specifically in terms of raw mobility.
It has better cross-country agility, especially in swampy terrain, and it can swim. The Bradley can ford shallow rivers but it’s not amphibious without a snorkel kit and prep time. The BMP-3, on the other hand, was designed with river crossings in mind. It can hit the water and just… keep going.
That makes it useful in places like southern Ukraine, where water barriers abound. But let’s be honest, if you’re relying on your IFV to float because you can’t cross a bridge that’s already been precision-struck by HIMARS, you’ve got bigger problems.
The BMP-3 also has a higher top speed and better acceleration on flat terrain, but that hardly matters when your vehicle can't survive a single direct hit.
Russian troops crawling inside the captured Bradley were surprised by how… livable it is. Compared to the Soviet school of “cram everyone into a metal box and hope for the best,” the Bradley is a palace.
It has a powered rear ramp for rapid ingress and egress, separate compartments for crew and infantry, and easier access to critical systems for field maintenance. The BMP-3? Rear access is awkward, the crew sits shoulder-to-shoulder with fuel tanks, and maintenance requires heroic patience and a toolkit blessed by the gods.
Russian researchers called out the Bradley’s superior ergonomics, easier repair protocols, and internal layout as decisive operational advantages. Translation: if your Bradley takes a hit, you can fix it and go back out. If your BMP-3 takes a hit, you’re lucky to be alive.
Lessons the Kremlin Can’t Ignore (But Might)
The final verdict from the Russian testing lab? The Bradley is better—full stop.
Not marginally. Not subjectively. Quantifiably better in armor, firepower, survivability, and crew layout. The only bright spots for the BMP-3 are swimming ability and speed.
This shouldn’t surprise anyone paying attention. The M2 Bradley was designed in the aftermath of Vietnam to bring American troops into the fight with more protection, more firepower, and better sensors.
Since then, it’s seen upgrades across the board, from digital battle management systems to ERA kits to counter-RPG cage armor.
The BMP-3, on the other hand, is a late Soviet-era design. It entered production in 1987. Most models in Russia’s arsenal haven’t seen significant upgrades since. And even when they do, Russian industry’s persistent microchip shortages and battlefield cannibalization mean most BMP-3s are patched together Frankenstein’s monsters.
This comparison isn’t just about hardware, it’s about doctrine. Western IFVs like the Bradley are designed to fight alongside tanks in combined arms operations. They're meant to keep up, protect their dismounts, and kill enemy armor if necessary.
Russian IFVs, by contrast, are designed to carry troops to the battlefield, then get out of the way. They’re not meant to trade blows with tanks or survive multi-hit engagements.
In Ukraine, that difference is proving decisive. Bradleys aren't just transporting infantry, they’re fighting. Ukrainians are using them in direct combat, surviving RPG hits, and taking out Russian armor with TOWs.
The BMP-3 simply can’t do that with the same confidence or survivability.
The Russian Ministry of Defense isn’t known for self-criticism. So, when one of its own institutes publishes a technical report admitting that a captured M2A2 ODS SA is better than their flagship IFV in nearly every meaningful way, it’s not just a datapoint; it’s a confession.
The Bradley isn’t perfect. It’s heavy. It guzzles fuel. And it’s expensive. But it works. It protects. It kills. And it keeps Ukrainian infantry alive when every second counts.
Russia’s answer so far? More BMP-3s, slapped with bolt-on ERA and wishful thinking.
In a war where every inch is paid for in blood and steel, Ukraine’s bet on Western armor is paying off. And thanks to battlefield evidence and grudging Russian analysis, we can say it plainly: the M2 Bradley isn’t just better, it’s the future of IFVs in modern warfare.
If you want a cool story about how a Ukrainian Bradley destroyed an advanced Russian T-90, read my article here. I’ve removed it from the paywall:
Слава Україні! Crimea is Ukraine.
It starts with a non-military philosophy that life is precious and individual lives are more important than the state. Under Russian then Soviet then Russian culture, the Czar, the State and the Mothwrland have the place of primacy. All other considerations are secondary and ultimately irrelevant as it pursues the maximalist development of the primary objective. There had never been a strong civic culture in Russia and it shows in how they build IFVs and fight wars. Good article
BMP-1 was a complete game-changer.
Its 73mm semi-auto gun to fire HE, co-axial MG and AT3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile gave it lethal firepower options for all target-types, when other infantry had only an armoured box with a defensive machine-gun.
But BMP-1 was introduced in 1966.
Russia has not progressed much since then, but the world has moved on.