US Air Force Will Replace the E3 Sentry With the Navy’s Hawkeye

What the actual f*ck is Hegseth thinking?

E-3 Sentry AWACS. Public domain

RANT START-

If you served on the E‑3 Sentry like I did, you felt the excitement when the E‑7 Wedgetail started looking like its heir: sleek, modern, based on a Boeing 737 platform, networked for future wars.

But during recent congressional testimony, SECDEF Hegseth just confirmed that the E-7 Wedgetail will NOT replace the elderly E-3 Sentry. Instead, the US Navy will give the Air Force five (5) carrier-based E-2D Hawkeye aircraft.

Watching the USAF ditch that for the Navy’s E‑2D Hawkeye? That feels less like a strategic pivot and more like settling for a consolation prize.

Born Excitement, Dying on the Tarmac
The Wedgetail cancellation hit like a punch to the gut for anyone who ever saw real potential in that aircraft, but instead of embracing ambition, the US Air Force quietly bagged it and reached for the Hawkeye. That alone tells you where priorities landed: not on cutting-edge tech or long-term capability, but on the ease of borrowing what the Navy already has.

The decision to pivot wasn’t fueled by a well-argued, capability-based analysis. It was fueled by fickleness, an allergy to cost overruns and schedule slips. So, they took the “cheaper, quicker, easier” route, ditching ambition for infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the E‑2D, already proven in carrier environments, got scooped into the USAF’s basket without much fuss. Its performance may be rock-solid, but that’s a far cry from innovating at the speed AEW systems need to evolve.

The result? We’re stuck flying yesterday’s solution into tomorrow’s challenges. And that, for all the Hawkeye’s virtues, feels like a patriotic retreat, not the push forward we demanded.

A Stopgap, Not a Stand‑in
The E‑2D Hawkeye substitution is precisely that, a stopgap, not a true stand-in for what the USAF had expected with the E‑7 Wedgetail.

Let’s unpack why it’s a placeholder, not a permanent fix:

First, operational depth matters. The E‑7 was designed as a strategic system, built to fly high, far, and long with a crew optimized for multi-domain control. It promised not just radar surveillance but advanced sensor fusion, space-accessible databuses, and real-time interoperability with jets, fighters, allies, and even satellites. The E‑2D, by comparison, is a rapid field expedient. Sure, it carries the AN/APY‑9 radar and can perform battle management roles admirably, but it wasn’t built or crewed to lead USAF missions across the Arctic, Europe, Indo-Pacific simultaneously. Its endurance, crew size, and cockpit architecture were tailored for carrier decks, not vast air domains.

Second, the system hand‑me‑down has consequences. The E‑2D brings legacy naval software, wiring looms, and mission systems that match Navy use‑cases, not Air Force workflows. Data links and communications weren’t originally optimized for USAF command-and-control, AWACS-style operations. That means ad-hoc integration, rewiring, software layering—all adding cost, time, and hidden complexity. This isn’t plug-and-play; it’s duct-tape integration on the fly.

Third, scalability is limited. The E‑7 plan estimated 26 aircraft, delivering assured coverage. Under USAF’s plan, five “expeditionary” E‑2Ds and more delayed arrivals are just a fraction of what the Ukraine-style high‑tempo, multi‑domain fight demands. These Hawkeyes will fill holes, but they won’t reshape the radar landscape.