Rob, there are a few different options for Hegseth to restrict.
The first is targeting data & mission planning. For weapons like Storm Shadow or ATACMS, you wouldn't punch in coordinates on the missile itself. The targeting data and mission profile are built using U.S. or NATO systems before the missile ever leaves the pylon. If the U.S. says “no strikes inside Russia,” they simply don’t release or authorize the mission data package for those coordinates. In other words, the missile never gets the “map” telling it to go there.
In some cases, restrictions can be hard-coded into the missile’s guidance software, a form of geofencing. For example, the U.S. has reportedly provided Ukraine with ATACMS that are “geographically limited.” That means if someone tries to program a target outside approved coordinates, the missile will either reject the mission plan or fail to arm. It’s like a digital leash.
But for ERAM, it's probably just a permission issue that Ukraine violates at its peril. The WSJ report notes that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth himself now has approval authority over long-range strikes. That’s not a technical block inside the missile; it’s bureaucratic choke control. No strike plan gets green-lit until it’s reviewed in Washington. So there would be some diplomatic/military agreement that requires Ukraine to check with Pete before any U.S. weapon employment. As you might imagine, this could drastically slow down the ops tempo.
“For weapons like Storm Shadow, ATACMS, or ERAM, you wouldn't punch in coordinates on the missile itself. The targeting data and mission profile are built using U.S. or NATO systems before the missile ever leaves the pylon. If the U.S. says “no strikes inside Russia,” they simply don’t release or authorize the mission data package for those coordinates”
On the other hand :
“But for ERAM, it's probably just a permission issue that Ukraine violates at its peril.”
I’m not sure I understand why it’s probable ERAM won’t suffer from restricted access to targeting data ?
Great catch, let me clarify. With something like Storm Shadow or ATACMS, yes, the U.S. and NATO are heavily involved in the mission planning and targeting data. That’s where Washington can essentially “pull the plug” on certain coordinates before the missile ever flies.
With ERAM, the situation is slightly different. It’s being marketed as a lower-cost, air-to-surface standoff weapon with simpler integration, think of it closer to a smart bomb or JASSM-lite than a Storm Shadow. That makes it less dependent on U.S. mission-planning infrastructure. In other words, Ukraine could technically load in their own targeting data.
The catch is political, not technical. Washington has already set up a review mechanism that says, “You want to use ERAM for a long-range strike? Ask permission first.” If Kyiv were to ignore that and fire into Russia anyway, they wouldn’t get their missiles taken away mid-flight, but they would risk the U.S. cutting off future resupply.
So the distinction is: some systems are restricted by design (you literally can’t make them fly where Washington doesn’t allow), while ERAM is more about policy and consequences. That’s why I said it’s “permission” Ukraine violates at its peril — it’s a leash, but not a digital one.
I mis-typed: I should remove "ERAM" from this sentence: For weapons like Storm Shadow, ATACMS, or ERAM...."
The French SCALPs are I believe essentially the same as the British StormShadows (they’re a joint venture btw the 2 countries). However the SCALPs are never mentioned in the context of US restrictions on targeting.
Hi Andre, the SCALP and Storm Shadow are absolutely linked like you said, they share the same internals. But because they rely on U.S. targeting feeds, they fall under exactly the same Pentagon approval rules that govern U.S. systems like ATACMS or ERAM. So even though you won’t often hear “SCALP restricted,” the restriction is there in practice.
What is the mechanism that allows the US to restrict range? Software?
Rob, there are a few different options for Hegseth to restrict.
The first is targeting data & mission planning. For weapons like Storm Shadow or ATACMS, you wouldn't punch in coordinates on the missile itself. The targeting data and mission profile are built using U.S. or NATO systems before the missile ever leaves the pylon. If the U.S. says “no strikes inside Russia,” they simply don’t release or authorize the mission data package for those coordinates. In other words, the missile never gets the “map” telling it to go there.
In some cases, restrictions can be hard-coded into the missile’s guidance software, a form of geofencing. For example, the U.S. has reportedly provided Ukraine with ATACMS that are “geographically limited.” That means if someone tries to program a target outside approved coordinates, the missile will either reject the mission plan or fail to arm. It’s like a digital leash.
But for ERAM, it's probably just a permission issue that Ukraine violates at its peril. The WSJ report notes that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth himself now has approval authority over long-range strikes. That’s not a technical block inside the missile; it’s bureaucratic choke control. No strike plan gets green-lit until it’s reviewed in Washington. So there would be some diplomatic/military agreement that requires Ukraine to check with Pete before any U.S. weapon employment. As you might imagine, this could drastically slow down the ops tempo.
Thanks for all the details !
I’m a bit confused however.
On the one end :
“For weapons like Storm Shadow, ATACMS, or ERAM, you wouldn't punch in coordinates on the missile itself. The targeting data and mission profile are built using U.S. or NATO systems before the missile ever leaves the pylon. If the U.S. says “no strikes inside Russia,” they simply don’t release or authorize the mission data package for those coordinates”
On the other hand :
“But for ERAM, it's probably just a permission issue that Ukraine violates at its peril.”
I’m not sure I understand why it’s probable ERAM won’t suffer from restricted access to targeting data ?
Great catch, let me clarify. With something like Storm Shadow or ATACMS, yes, the U.S. and NATO are heavily involved in the mission planning and targeting data. That’s where Washington can essentially “pull the plug” on certain coordinates before the missile ever flies.
With ERAM, the situation is slightly different. It’s being marketed as a lower-cost, air-to-surface standoff weapon with simpler integration, think of it closer to a smart bomb or JASSM-lite than a Storm Shadow. That makes it less dependent on U.S. mission-planning infrastructure. In other words, Ukraine could technically load in their own targeting data.
The catch is political, not technical. Washington has already set up a review mechanism that says, “You want to use ERAM for a long-range strike? Ask permission first.” If Kyiv were to ignore that and fire into Russia anyway, they wouldn’t get their missiles taken away mid-flight, but they would risk the U.S. cutting off future resupply.
So the distinction is: some systems are restricted by design (you literally can’t make them fly where Washington doesn’t allow), while ERAM is more about policy and consequences. That’s why I said it’s “permission” Ukraine violates at its peril — it’s a leash, but not a digital one.
I mis-typed: I should remove "ERAM" from this sentence: For weapons like Storm Shadow, ATACMS, or ERAM...."
Thanks for clarifying!
The French SCALPs are I believe essentially the same as the British StormShadows (they’re a joint venture btw the 2 countries). However the SCALPs are never mentioned in the context of US restrictions on targeting.
Would you happen to know more about that issue ?
Hi Andre, the SCALP and Storm Shadow are absolutely linked like you said, they share the same internals. But because they rely on U.S. targeting feeds, they fall under exactly the same Pentagon approval rules that govern U.S. systems like ATACMS or ERAM. So even though you won’t often hear “SCALP restricted,” the restriction is there in practice.