Balls to the wallz. Keep it going Wes. The world needs to understand that, although this action against Iran was an "historical necessity" the politicos behind the controls are not to be trusted. There has been 47 years (funny that number popping up again) to develop and execute a coalition plan, not the circus act with critical consequences we are seeing played out. Thanks for helping make sense of it in nrt.
After Pearl, the civilian leadership of the military cleaned house on generals and admirals who thought in terms of the past and promoted change agents with vision. Who will be Marshall or King now? Hegseth is no Stimson or Knox.
Given the current 'command' structure of the US military, starting with El Doofus Primero, how long it will take the Pentagon to recognize, assess and adjust to this new war (the one that Ukraine has been fighting for four years)? We had to cycle through a bunch of old school generals in the Civil War before we found Grant, and similar experiences can be found around the world. Given how long the current military bureaucracy has been slowly ossifying from within, I can imagine a lot more damage might occur. And God help us if the Chinese decide to act.
Why is it that US military bloggers start to sound like the Russian Z ones? 🤔🥶
The US if far above the state of Russia, where a donkey is latest tech, but the same basic issue is present: hubris.
European NATO countries are hit too, but the small format of their armies does not favor hubris as much. Instead they "imported" hubris from US support and training. Ukraine has real peer-to-peer combat experience and they teach hard lessons during common exercise. Will Europe learn before it is too late?
Actually, as I was writing this, I thought to myself that I'm starting to sound like Z bloggers who always complain about their shitty Russian military.
Maybe conman von corrupt trump and his inept clown of sec of war just got rid of real competent people to replace them with loyal ones, a more important feature in this fascist admin. Who knows?
We can feel your pain Wes about 0005, but the REALLY infuriating bit is that Trump and his lackeys Rubio, Hegseth, Kushner and Witkoff still don’t treat Putin as an enemy.
You have the nail right on the head Wes. I can't believe it would do anything this stupid, , but they did! Other reason for traitor Trump to go to jail. He is so far up Putin's behind and he's not doing a thing about the fact that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran!
Wes, this is a hard piece to read — and precisely because of that, it lands. You’re not just analysing a strike; you’re describing a **failure of adaptation** in plain sight.
What your piece surfaces — very clearly — is that this isn’t just about one AWACS.
It’s about a system that **knew the lesson… and didn’t fully internalise it**.
---
Your core point is exactly right:
> we’ve seen this movie already
Ukraine proved that:
* rear areas are conditional
* high-value assets are targetable
* and cheap systems can break expensive ones
And yet, as you show, that lesson didn’t fully translate into practice.
---
Where I’d extend your argument slightly is here:
This isn’t just a **force protection failure**.
It’s a **systems integration failure under time pressure**.
Because everything you describe points to the same gap:
* data likely existed
* indicators were visible
* patterns were detectable
But:
**they weren’t fused fast enough into action.**
---
That matters, because the environment has changed.
You’re no longer defending against:
* a single actor
* a single strike chain
* or a linear threat
You’re defending against **cooperative kill chains**:
* one actor collects
* another analyses
* another executes
Which compresses decision time dramatically.
---
And that brings us to the political layer — which your piece touches, but doesn’t fully unpack.
If Russia did assist Iran in targeting a US strategic asset, then we’re no longer in a grey zone.
We’re in a situation where:
**a state the US leadership is attempting to “work with”
is simultaneously enabling attacks on US military capability.**
---
That creates a problem not just operationally — but institutionally.
Because the question becomes:
**is that relationship politically sustainable?**
---
Here the US Congress becomes decisive.
Historically, Congress reacts very differently depending on whether:
* an incident is ambiguous
* or whether US assets are clearly degraded by hostile coordination
If the perception hardens that:
* Russia is materially enabling Iranian strikes
* against US forces or assets
then you are likely to see pressure in three directions:
1. **Oversight escalation**
Hearings, intelligence reviews, demands for attribution clarity
2. **Sanctions / legislative constraints**
Especially targeting Russia–Iran cooperation channels
3. **Limits on executive flexibility**
Congress historically pushes back when cooperation appears to cross into exposure or vulnerability
---
And here’s the key point:
Congress does not operate on the same timeline as diplomacy.
It reacts to:
* visibility
* narrative clarity
* and political risk
---
So the sustainability of any “cooperation” with Moscow depends on one thing:
**whether this is perceived as ambiguity — or alignment.**
* If ambiguous → politically manageable
* If aligned → politically corrosive
---
Your piece, in effect, pushes the interpretation toward alignment.
Because a cooperative kill chain is not incidental.
It implies:
**shared operational effect, even if not shared intent.**
---
And that’s where your analysis connects to something larger:
We’re moving into a world where:
* alliances are fluid
* coordination is indirect
* and responsibility is harder to attribute
But the political system — especially in Washington — still needs **clear categories**:
* partner
* competitor
* adversary
---
If Russia is seen as enabling attacks on US assets while being treated as a negotiating partner, that contradiction becomes difficult to sustain.
Not necessarily immediately.
But over time, it creates **institutional friction** that builds.
---
So your conclusion about the real lesson is exactly right:
> this should scare people more than the cooperation itself
Yes — because it shows:
**the operational environment has changed faster than the system managing it.**
---
And once that gap becomes visible,
it doesn’t stay purely military.
It becomes political.
Wes, this is a hard piece to read — and precisely because of that, it lands. You’re not just analysing a strike; you’re describing a **failure of adaptation** in plain sight.
What your piece surfaces — very clearly — is that this isn’t just about one AWACS.
It’s about a system that **knew the lesson… and didn’t fully internalise it**.
---
Your core point is exactly right:
> we’ve seen this movie already
Ukraine proved that:
* rear areas are conditional
* high-value assets are targetable
* and cheap systems can break expensive ones
And yet, as you show, that lesson didn’t fully translate into practice.
---
Where I’d extend your argument slightly is here:
This isn’t just a **force protection failure**.
It’s a **systems integration failure under time pressure**.
Because everything you describe points to the same gap:
* data likely existed
* indicators were visible
* patterns were detectable
But:
**they weren’t fused fast enough into action.**
---
That matters, because the environment has changed.
You’re no longer defending against:
* a single actor
* a single strike chain
* or a linear threat
You’re defending against **cooperative kill chains**:
* one actor collects
* another analyses
* another executes
Which compresses decision time dramatically.
---
And that brings us to the political layer — which your piece touches, but doesn’t fully unpack.
If Russia did assist Iran in targeting a US strategic asset, then we’re no longer in a grey zone.
We’re in a situation where:
**a state the US leadership is attempting to “work with”
is simultaneously enabling attacks on US military capability.**
---
That creates a problem not just operationally — but institutionally.
Because the question becomes:
**is that relationship politically sustainable?**
---
Here the US Congress becomes decisive.
Historically, Congress reacts very differently depending on whether:
* an incident is ambiguous
* or whether US assets are clearly degraded by hostile coordination
If the perception hardens that:
* Russia is materially enabling Iranian strikes
* against US forces or assets
then you are likely to see pressure in three directions:
1. **Oversight escalation**
Hearings, intelligence reviews, demands for attribution clarity
2. **Sanctions / legislative constraints**
Especially targeting Russia–Iran cooperation channels
3. **Limits on executive flexibility**
Congress historically pushes back when cooperation appears to cross into exposure or vulnerability
---
And here’s the key point:
Congress does not operate on the same timeline as diplomacy.
It reacts to:
* visibility
* narrative clarity
* and political risk
---
So the sustainability of any “cooperation” with Moscow depends on one thing:
**whether this is perceived as ambiguity — or alignment.**
* If ambiguous → politically manageable
* If aligned → politically corrosive
---
Your piece, in effect, pushes the interpretation toward alignment.
Because a cooperative kill chain is not incidental.
It implies:
**shared operational effect, even if not shared intent.**
---
And that’s where your analysis connects to something larger:
We’re moving into a world where:
* alliances are fluid
* coordination is indirect
* and responsibility is harder to attribute
But the political system — especially in Washington — still needs **clear categories**:
* partner
* competitor
* adversary
---
If Russia is seen as enabling attacks on US assets while being treated as a negotiating partner, that contradiction becomes difficult to sustain.
Not necessarily immediately.
But over time, it creates **institutional friction** that builds.
---
So your conclusion about the real lesson is exactly right:
> this should scare people more than the cooperation itself
Yes — because it shows:
**the operational environment has changed faster than the system managing it.**
We are so unprepared for modern warfare.
Balls to the wallz. Keep it going Wes. The world needs to understand that, although this action against Iran was an "historical necessity" the politicos behind the controls are not to be trusted. There has been 47 years (funny that number popping up again) to develop and execute a coalition plan, not the circus act with critical consequences we are seeing played out. Thanks for helping make sense of it in nrt.
Darn it, Wes!
I’m sorry!
This whole post is equal parts sad, scary, and infuriating.
Don’t eat too many Tim Tams over it.
Not a joke. Sugar blues are real and you don’t need that kind of interference affecting your reasoning right now.
Thank you for your analysis.
Some things, Tina, cannot be done without! Down Under (here), we have our Tim Tams. Diesel by next month on the other hand, hmmm…
After Pearl, the civilian leadership of the military cleaned house on generals and admirals who thought in terms of the past and promoted change agents with vision. Who will be Marshall or King now? Hegseth is no Stimson or Knox.
Given the current 'command' structure of the US military, starting with El Doofus Primero, how long it will take the Pentagon to recognize, assess and adjust to this new war (the one that Ukraine has been fighting for four years)? We had to cycle through a bunch of old school generals in the Civil War before we found Grant, and similar experiences can be found around the world. Given how long the current military bureaucracy has been slowly ossifying from within, I can imagine a lot more damage might occur. And God help us if the Chinese decide to act.
Why is it that US military bloggers start to sound like the Russian Z ones? 🤔🥶
The US if far above the state of Russia, where a donkey is latest tech, but the same basic issue is present: hubris.
European NATO countries are hit too, but the small format of their armies does not favor hubris as much. Instead they "imported" hubris from US support and training. Ukraine has real peer-to-peer combat experience and they teach hard lessons during common exercise. Will Europe learn before it is too late?
Actually, as I was writing this, I thought to myself that I'm starting to sound like Z bloggers who always complain about their shitty Russian military.
…and nemesis surely follows.
Maybe conman von corrupt trump and his inept clown of sec of war just got rid of real competent people to replace them with loyal ones, a more important feature in this fascist admin. Who knows?
When I heard about that strike, I turned the air blue! WTF? was the nicest thing I said.
And trump has lost his war in Iran
We can feel your pain Wes about 0005, but the REALLY infuriating bit is that Trump and his lackeys Rubio, Hegseth, Kushner and Witkoff still don’t treat Putin as an enemy.
Hi Dr. Hans!
Your comment has lots of merit.
You may want to edit it?
It is long, yes, and that is okay bc it makes sense and addresses all the points Wes makes.
What I’m seeing is that there are two copies of your comment stacked on top of each other.
Will you check, please?🙏
You have the nail right on the head Wes. I can't believe it would do anything this stupid, , but they did! Other reason for traitor Trump to go to jail. He is so far up Putin's behind and he's not doing a thing about the fact that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran!
Russia Probably Helped Iran Kill the AWACS
Wes, this is a hard piece to read — and precisely because of that, it lands. You’re not just analysing a strike; you’re describing a **failure of adaptation** in plain sight.
What your piece surfaces — very clearly — is that this isn’t just about one AWACS.
It’s about a system that **knew the lesson… and didn’t fully internalise it**.
---
Your core point is exactly right:
> we’ve seen this movie already
Ukraine proved that:
* rear areas are conditional
* high-value assets are targetable
* and cheap systems can break expensive ones
And yet, as you show, that lesson didn’t fully translate into practice.
---
Where I’d extend your argument slightly is here:
This isn’t just a **force protection failure**.
It’s a **systems integration failure under time pressure**.
Because everything you describe points to the same gap:
* data likely existed
* indicators were visible
* patterns were detectable
But:
**they weren’t fused fast enough into action.**
---
That matters, because the environment has changed.
You’re no longer defending against:
* a single actor
* a single strike chain
* or a linear threat
You’re defending against **cooperative kill chains**:
* one actor collects
* another analyses
* another executes
Which compresses decision time dramatically.
---
And that brings us to the political layer — which your piece touches, but doesn’t fully unpack.
If Russia did assist Iran in targeting a US strategic asset, then we’re no longer in a grey zone.
We’re in a situation where:
**a state the US leadership is attempting to “work with”
is simultaneously enabling attacks on US military capability.**
---
That creates a problem not just operationally — but institutionally.
Because the question becomes:
**is that relationship politically sustainable?**
---
Here the US Congress becomes decisive.
Historically, Congress reacts very differently depending on whether:
* an incident is ambiguous
* or whether US assets are clearly degraded by hostile coordination
If the perception hardens that:
* Russia is materially enabling Iranian strikes
* against US forces or assets
then you are likely to see pressure in three directions:
1. **Oversight escalation**
Hearings, intelligence reviews, demands for attribution clarity
2. **Sanctions / legislative constraints**
Especially targeting Russia–Iran cooperation channels
3. **Limits on executive flexibility**
Congress historically pushes back when cooperation appears to cross into exposure or vulnerability
---
And here’s the key point:
Congress does not operate on the same timeline as diplomacy.
It reacts to:
* visibility
* narrative clarity
* and political risk
---
So the sustainability of any “cooperation” with Moscow depends on one thing:
**whether this is perceived as ambiguity — or alignment.**
* If ambiguous → politically manageable
* If aligned → politically corrosive
---
Your piece, in effect, pushes the interpretation toward alignment.
Because a cooperative kill chain is not incidental.
It implies:
**shared operational effect, even if not shared intent.**
---
And that’s where your analysis connects to something larger:
We’re moving into a world where:
* alliances are fluid
* coordination is indirect
* and responsibility is harder to attribute
But the political system — especially in Washington — still needs **clear categories**:
* partner
* competitor
* adversary
---
If Russia is seen as enabling attacks on US assets while being treated as a negotiating partner, that contradiction becomes difficult to sustain.
Not necessarily immediately.
But over time, it creates **institutional friction** that builds.
---
So your conclusion about the real lesson is exactly right:
> this should scare people more than the cooperation itself
Yes — because it shows:
**the operational environment has changed faster than the system managing it.**
---
And once that gap becomes visible,
it doesn’t stay purely military.
It becomes political.
Wes, this is a hard piece to read — and precisely because of that, it lands. You’re not just analysing a strike; you’re describing a **failure of adaptation** in plain sight.
What your piece surfaces — very clearly — is that this isn’t just about one AWACS.
It’s about a system that **knew the lesson… and didn’t fully internalise it**.
---
Your core point is exactly right:
> we’ve seen this movie already
Ukraine proved that:
* rear areas are conditional
* high-value assets are targetable
* and cheap systems can break expensive ones
And yet, as you show, that lesson didn’t fully translate into practice.
---
Where I’d extend your argument slightly is here:
This isn’t just a **force protection failure**.
It’s a **systems integration failure under time pressure**.
Because everything you describe points to the same gap:
* data likely existed
* indicators were visible
* patterns were detectable
But:
**they weren’t fused fast enough into action.**
---
That matters, because the environment has changed.
You’re no longer defending against:
* a single actor
* a single strike chain
* or a linear threat
You’re defending against **cooperative kill chains**:
* one actor collects
* another analyses
* another executes
Which compresses decision time dramatically.
---
And that brings us to the political layer — which your piece touches, but doesn’t fully unpack.
If Russia did assist Iran in targeting a US strategic asset, then we’re no longer in a grey zone.
We’re in a situation where:
**a state the US leadership is attempting to “work with”
is simultaneously enabling attacks on US military capability.**
---
That creates a problem not just operationally — but institutionally.
Because the question becomes:
**is that relationship politically sustainable?**
---
Here the US Congress becomes decisive.
Historically, Congress reacts very differently depending on whether:
* an incident is ambiguous
* or whether US assets are clearly degraded by hostile coordination
If the perception hardens that:
* Russia is materially enabling Iranian strikes
* against US forces or assets
then you are likely to see pressure in three directions:
1. **Oversight escalation**
Hearings, intelligence reviews, demands for attribution clarity
2. **Sanctions / legislative constraints**
Especially targeting Russia–Iran cooperation channels
3. **Limits on executive flexibility**
Congress historically pushes back when cooperation appears to cross into exposure or vulnerability
---
And here’s the key point:
Congress does not operate on the same timeline as diplomacy.
It reacts to:
* visibility
* narrative clarity
* and political risk
---
So the sustainability of any “cooperation” with Moscow depends on one thing:
**whether this is perceived as ambiguity — or alignment.**
* If ambiguous → politically manageable
* If aligned → politically corrosive
---
Your piece, in effect, pushes the interpretation toward alignment.
Because a cooperative kill chain is not incidental.
It implies:
**shared operational effect, even if not shared intent.**
---
And that’s where your analysis connects to something larger:
We’re moving into a world where:
* alliances are fluid
* coordination is indirect
* and responsibility is harder to attribute
But the political system — especially in Washington — still needs **clear categories**:
* partner
* competitor
* adversary
---
If Russia is seen as enabling attacks on US assets while being treated as a negotiating partner, that contradiction becomes difficult to sustain.
Not necessarily immediately.
But over time, it creates **institutional friction** that builds.
---
So your conclusion about the real lesson is exactly right:
> this should scare people more than the cooperation itself
Yes — because it shows:
**the operational environment has changed faster than the system managing it.**
---
And once that gap becomes visible,
it doesn’t stay purely military.
It becomes political.