Britain’s defense secretary just steered a Ukrainian-designed sea drone off Portugal from the deck of HMS Prince of Wales in Norway, more than 1,500 miles away. The boat is UFORCE’s MV7, a British-built successor to Ukraine’s Magura family, the drones that sank Russian warships and downed Russian Su-30 jets with Sidewinder missiles.
With £113 million in new British investment behind it, I break down how Ukraine rewrote naval warfare in the Black Sea, what the MV7 changes for Atlantic weather, how you control a boat from 1,500 miles away, and what it still has to prove for the Royal Navy.
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Rough Transcript:
Britain’s defense secretary just took control of a Ukrainian naval drone from the deck of an aircraft carrier in Norway.
The boat itself was operating more than 1,500 miles away, off Portugal.
This is a descendant of the Magura sea drones Ukraine used to sink Russian warships and, remarkably, shoot down Russian fighter jets. And Britain has now invested 113 million pounds in the company making them.
There’s an interesting detail in that 1,500-mile demonstration. The drone didn’t sail from Norway to Portugal. The minister was controlling it from that far away, which raises a much more useful military question: can the Royal Navy command fleets of Ukrainian-designed boats across the Atlantic without putting sailors aboard them? Is this the new way Britania rules the waves in the 21st Century?
I’ve got answers.
The Ukrainians have already shown what these machines can do to the Russian Navy. Britain wants to find out what happens when you give them a much bigger ocean.
Hey friends, Wes O’Donnell here.
As an American, I’ve always admired the Royal Navy. This is an institution that helped build an empire, fought the Spanish Armada and spent several centuries making life exceptionally unpleasant for anyone foolish enough to challenge it at sea.
So naturally, its next big naval technology has arrived courtesy of Ukraine, a country whose navy Russia was fairly confident it had already destroyed.
And there’s something kind of awesome about the defense secretary trying out a remote-controlled boat aboard HMS Prince of Wales.
Most politicians are only allowed near military equipment after somebody has checked the insurance policy.
The demonstration happened during the Atlantic Future Forum in Norway. I want to look at the Ukrainian combat record, the new British boat, and the problem of operating these things over enormous distances.
But first, how did Ukraine break the Black Sea playbook?
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion, it possessed an enormous advantage at sea. The Black Sea Fleet had missiles, naval aviation and major warships. Ukraine had a handful of conventional naval assets left and no realistic way to fight Russia ship for ship.
So Ukrainian engineers started building small, remotely operated attack boats. Some carried explosives directly into enemy vessels. Others gradually took on reconnaissance missions and different weapons.
The Magura V5 became one of the best-known designs. In February 2024, Ukrainian military intelligence used Magura drones to sink the Russian missile boat Ivanovets. A month later, drones from the same family sank the patrol ship Sergei Kotov. Russian commanders had to account for boats that were low in the water, difficult to spot, and perfectly willing to ram an expensive warship with a large explosive charge. The tactical problem was nasty. A warship’s guns and surveillance systems were designed to handle conventional naval threats. A small attacking boat presented a different target, particularly at night. Russian sailors had to find it early, keep track of it, and stop it before it closed the distance. Ukraine could send several at once.
Then the Magura family acquired a capability I still find outrageous. In May 2025, Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Magura V7 boats armed with American AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea.
Janes reported supporting information for one of the losses from Russian sources, although the full account of both engagements remains based on Ukrainian reporting.
Think about the indignity for a moment. You’re flying a multimillion-dollar Russian fighter over the sea, and your biggest problem turns out to be a boat without a crew.
I suspect the after-action briefing was a fairly uncomfortable experience.
The point isn’t that every Magura carries anti-aircraft missiles. It doesn’t. The family has grown into different configurations because Ukraine kept finding new military jobs for it.
Britain has bought into that development experience, and its version has been modified for a very different body of water.
UFORCE, a company founded by Ukrainians and now headquartered in London, unveiled its first UK-developed MV7 in August. It was launched in British waters off the south coast. The company says the design incorporates lessons from Ukraine’s Magura V7, with a hull adapted for the harsher conditions encountered in the Atlantic and northern European seas.
The MV7 is about 7.8 metres long, or roughly twenty-six feet. That’s roughly three-quarters the length of a typical London double-decker, although nobody is asking the bus to race across the Atlantic with missiles aboard.
UFORCE lists a top speed of around 39 knots, more than forty-four miles an hour, and a maximum advertised range of around 800 nautical miles. The diesel-powered craft uses a waterjet or sterndrive arrangement and can carry a payload of up to about 650 kilograms in its standard published configuration.
Its hull combines fibreglass with carbon and Kevlar reinforcement. Those materials help designers manage weight and strength, but the crucial British change is the boat’s tolerance for rougher water.
The original Magura V7 was described by UFORCE as operational in sea states two to three. The Atlantic MV7 is rated by the manufacturer for operations in sea state four and survival in sea state six. That’s a significant design objective. Sea state four can mean waves around one and a quarter to two and a half metres high. Sea state six is considerably worse. There is an important distinction between surviving bad weather and fighting effectively in it. A boat might remain afloat in conditions that make accurate sensing, stable weapons operation, or recovery alongside a larger ship extremely difficult. Those are precisely the problems Royal Navy crews will want the manufacturer to demonstrate in the North Atlantic.
And a British winter is famously reluctant to cooperate with any plan involving a pleasant day at sea.
I’m going to tell you from experience that there is a real difference between published military performance figures and getting equipment to work in miserable conditions. “Military grade” is a joke among veterans, and yet, marketers keep slapping the words military grade on their swag.
The company’s available configurations include one-way attack boats and reusable platforms that can carry remote weapons, air-defence missiles or reconnaissance equipment. A reusable patrol craft can return to base after completing a mission. A boat carrying an explosive charge for a one-way attack has a rather shorter career path.
Hold on. How do you drive a boat from 1,500 miles away?
On November 12, the British government disclosed that Defence Secretary Wes Streeting had remotely piloted a UFORCE MV7 while aboard HMS Prince of Wales in Norway. The vessel itself was operating near Portugal, more than 1,500 miles from the carrier. That distance describes the command link between the operator and the boat. It’s different from the MV7’s advertised physical range of around 800 nautical miles. The little craft wasn’t demonstrating a 1,500-mile voyage on one tank of diesel.
I can hear the engineers in the comments already, firing up their keyboards.
At close range, a drone boat can receive commands over a radio link. At more than 1,500 miles, you need a communications path that can carry instructions and information far beyond the radio horizon.
That generally means some combination of satellite communications or other long-haul network infrastructure. The British announcement doesn’t identify the exact system used during this demonstration, and there’s no reason to invent one.
The operator sends commands. The vessel receives them, adjusts course or speed, and sends information back. Depending on the software, some navigation tasks may be handled onboard rather than requiring somebody to manipulate the controls every second. And that’s where the word autonomy matters. A remotely piloted boat depends on a human operator. An autonomous boat can carry out certain approved tasks between commands, such as following a route or maintaining a designated patrol pattern. That doesn’t establish that it can independently choose a target or fire a weapon, and Britain hasn’t announced that sort of authority for the MV7.
It also doesn’t guarantee that communications will survive a fight with Russia.
Russian electronic warfare has complicated Ukrainian drone operations for years. An enemy can jam radio signals, interfere with satellite navigation or try to disrupt the information connecting an operator to an unmanned vehicle. The Atlantic creates another difficulty: long distances and weather leave fewer convenient opportunities to recover a malfunctioning craft.
If the link disappears, the vessel needs clear instructions about what happens next. Depending on the mission, stopping, holding a position or attempting to return may be safer than continuing.
Those behaviours have to be tested, and they become especially important when a boat is carrying weapons near other ships.
I think this is what made the carrier demonstration useful. Britain showed that it could put the human operator in one part of Europe and the unmanned vessel in another. The much harder job is making that arrangement dependable under wartime conditions.
So what could the Royal Navy do with it?
The Royal Navy already has a plan for uncrewed systems in the Atlantic. It’s called Atlantic Bastion, a programme intended to improve Britain’s ability to find Russian submarines and protect critical infrastructure beneath the sea.
Just two days before the UFORCE announcement, the government announced a separate ninety-million-pound initiative involving Ocean Infinity and a network called Atlantic Net. That work concentrates on underwater sensing and autonomous systems. It’s separate from the investment in UFORCE, and the MV7 hasn’t been announced as the Royal Navy’s new submarine hunter. But it helps explain the naval requirement. Britain has a huge area of ocean to watch. Russian submarines and specialist vessels have operated around the North Atlantic, including near infrastructure that carries communications or energy. The Royal Navy can’t put a frigate beside every suspicious vessel or underwater cable.
An uncrewed surface boat could eventually patrol an area, carry sensors, relay information or support operations by a larger warship. Some configurations might serve as decoys or extend the number of places from which a force can observe an approaching threat. The exact roles would depend on the sensors installed and Royal Navy testing.
It would be a mistake to assume that a fast surface drone with a camera can automatically detect submarines. Underwater acoustic sensing is a separate technical problem. UFORCE would need suitable equipment and integration with the Navy’s wider network before the MV7 could contribute in that way.
There are more immediate uses.
A vessel small enough to operate without a crew can examine a suspicious surface contact without sending sailors into the same danger. It might support harbour security or help a warship keep watch over a wider area. Depending on its weapons, it could eventually take on some surface or air threats. And Britain isn’t operating alone. The Joint Expeditionary Force, or JEF, brings together ten northern European countries, including Norway and the Nordic and Baltic states. A British-built MV7 that’s compatible with allied command systems could be useful far beyond the waters off Portsmouth.
The strategic opportunity is to give a relatively small number of expensive warships access to many more sensors and platforms. The Navy will still need trained sailors and large ships to sustain operations, but not every job requires a crew standing on the deck of the vehicle doing it.
The British government isn’t spending 113 million pounds to purchase a known number of MV7s for Royal Navy squadrons. Through the National Wealth Fund, it’s making an equity investment in UFORCE as part of the company’s seven-hundred-million-dollar funding round. That money supports an expansion of engineering and manufacturing in Britain. The government says more than seventy per cent of the content of each UK-built boat will come from British suppliers, covering components such as hulls, engines and electronics. The company expects to create hundreds of skilled jobs.
That’s useful industrial policy, but I wouldn’t call it a Royal Navy procurement success yet.
The bigger military value will come when Britain can produce the vessels at scale, equip them for actual missions, and keep them operating without relying on supply chains that may be disrupted in a crisis.
And there’s something satisfying about the direction of this partnership…
Britain helped train and equip Ukraine after Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian engineers then built boats capable of damaging Russian warships. Now a Ukrainian-founded company is bringing that experience to British shipbuilding and defence software.
The expansion also supports production for Ukraine. This isn’t a case of Britain taking some clever Ukrainian design away from the people still fighting. UFORCE intends to manufacture for Ukraine as well as British and allied customers. I would actually prefer more arrangements like this. Get the Ukrainian designers into the same workshops as British engineers, test the result in awful weather, and buy the boats that work. Defence procurement is difficult enough without insisting that every useful idea be invented in Whitehall first.
As for Russia, Russian commanders have already experienced the tactical effect of the Magura family. In the Black Sea, inexpensive unmanned craft forced expensive warships to defend against threats that approached from the surface at relatively high speed. The arrival of missile-carrying variants meant aircraft could no longer assume the sea below them was harmless.
The North Atlantic presents different geography and much harder weather. It also contains NATO warships, submarines and aircraft that Ukraine didn’t have in the Black Sea. An MV7 would be another element in that larger force, not a substitute for it.
What makes the British move interesting is that the Royal Navy is studying technology shaped by real encounters with Russia. Engineers already know how fast an adversary adapts once drones start threatening its ships. They have battle experience to work from instead of waiting for the next exercise to reveal the first obvious flaw.
We still need to see what Britain orders, how the new craft perform through a northern winter, and whether long-distance control remains reliable under deliberate interference. Those tests will decide whether the investment produces a useful military capability.
The defence secretary commanding a drone boat from 1,500 miles away is a fine demonstration. It’s even more interesting when you consider what Ukrainian sailors and drone operators have already achieved with the machines that inspired it.
Four years ago, Russia expected its navy to dominate the Black Sea while Ukraine struggled to defend its coast. Ukrainian engineers built the Magura family, and Russian commanders began losing ships to boats without crews.
Now Britain is manufacturing a version intended for Atlantic weather, while the Royal Navy develops a future force that includes far more autonomous vessels.
I think that’s a sensible direction for British naval power.
Large warships remain essential, but the Navy shouldn’t have to expose a ship full of sailors every time it needs to inspect a threat or put another sensor on the water.
And if Russia is annoyed that Ukrainian naval technology is now helping protect Britain’s northern waters, I imagine the Ukrainians can live with that.
That’s it for today, friends. I’d especially like to hear from the Royal Navy veterans watching. Where would you put a small, fast unmanned boat to work first, and what would you demand it prove before trusting it in Atlantic weather?
If you enjoyed this breakdown, hit the thumbs up and subscribe. I cover Ukraine, NATO and military technology four times a week.
And as always, Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes, Crimea is Ukraine.
I use AI extensively in my research. Tools like God’s Eye View and SITDECK help me monitor hundreds of news feeds and open-source intelligence sources simultaneously. I also use Claude to help check factual claims and locate supporting sources. I still examine the underlying evidence, verify the reporting personally, and write my articles myself. After writing, I use Grammarly’s AI tool to correct punctuation and spelling.
I’ve disabled Substack’s AI detection feature because I don’t believe a computer can reliably determine who wrote something by examining the finished prose. I’ve had explainer articles I personally wrote in 2017 flagged as partially AI-generated. Apparently, a younger Wes had access to technology from the future. For another example, I wrote a book on writing and public speaking in 2020 called “Own the Crowd” where I have a chapter dedicated to the power of using threes to make a point stick; yet three of anything is now a signature of AI writing? I’m calling BS. I don’t believe in forcing human writers to prove their humanity to an algorithm.
I’m including this blurb at the bottom of every Substack article. I’ve explained my reasoning in greater detail here: Substack’s AI Detector Wants Me to Write Worse. Stay frosty.



Thanks much for the transcript, Wes.
A good article, Wes.
Satellite communications or long haul network infrastructure proves its use with control of sea drones, etcetera.
The issue for me is who owns the aforementioned and who can disable it? As PM Carney indicated after the Starlink/Starshield interference by “someone” in the USA this incident to Ukraine’s detriment “can’t be unseen”.